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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sustain a conviction in the hypothetical hereinbefore presented, it is
suggested that a statute such as that in force in Canada45 is desirable.
Under the Canadian statute, the elements of the offense are two:
(1) impairment of the defendant's ability to drive a motor vehicle by
alcohol; and (2) having the care or control of a motor vehicle during
such impairment. Such a statute properly relieves the courts of the
burden of trying to reconcile the need for full proof of guilt of the
accused with the conflicting need for protection of the public on the
highways. It properly raises a presumption against one who is found in
such circumstances, yet it does not foreclose a showing by the defendant
that he was not actually in control 6 of the vehicle, and was not, there-
fore, creating the danger which is to be obviated.
LUxE R. CORBETT
Criminal Procedure-Arrest Without a Warrant-Informer's Tip as
Constituting Reasonable Grounds
In Draper v. United States' a federal narcotics agent was notified by
a hired informer that defendant was peddling dope to several addicts
in the Denver area. Four days later the informer revealed that de-
fendant would go to Chicago to get heroin on a certain day and that
he would return on a morning train on either of two given days. The
informer's tips had always been reliable in the past. The agent had
never heard of defendant before and it was not shown whether or not
he had a criminal record. A complete description of physical char-
acteristics, clothing, and manner of walking was given. On the morn-
ing of the second day the agent saw a man leaving the Chicago train
who matched the description given by the informer. Defendant was
approached and seized by the agent. When he gave a name which did
not correspond with the tip his wallet was taken and his true identity
learned. He was placed under arrest and a search of his person re-
vealed two ounces of heroin and a syringe. The agent had no warrant.
Before tria2 defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment3
because made incident to an unlawful arrest. Thus the sole issue on the
"CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) (later amended, Criminal Code,
1954, 2-3 ELiz. 2, c. 51, §§ 222-24 (Canada)).
"Rex v. Johnston, [1950] 97 Can. Crim. R. 345, 3 D.L.R. 48 (dictum). Cf.
Jowett-Shooter v. Franklin, [1949] 2 All E.R. 730 (K.B.) (Defendant who got
into a car, but not under the steering wheel, and not intending to drive, found to
be in charge of vehicle, but driving permit not suspended because no intent to
drive).
'248 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1957).
2United States v. Draper, 146 F. Supp. 689 (D. Colo. 1956).
'U.S. CoTsT. amend. IV.
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defendant's motion was the lawfulness of the arrest. The motion was
denied and defendant was tried and convicted. The court of appeals,
in affirming, found the arrest valid because "the information furnished,
together with the verification thereof after appellant alighted from the
train, was sufficient to give the agent reasonable grounds to believe that
appellant was committing a violation of the Narcotics Act."4
A strong dissenting opinion argued that the arrest was unlawful
because, inter alia, hearsay information alone, with no other indication
of guilt within the officer's knowledge, is not a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt.5 This contention presents a problem which has not
infrequently been before the federal courts, viz., the weight to be given
an informer's tip in determining whether an officer arresting without a
warrant had "reasonable grounds."6
To be given any effect at all the information must come from one
who is reliable. An uncorroborated tip by an informer whose identity
248 F.2d at 299.
Judge Huxman, writing the dissent, also stated that the arrest was unlawful
because the exigencies of the situation did not call for arrest without a warrant.
Such a requirement is not generally said to be a prerequisite for a valid arrest.
The common law rule is that "where an officer, in good faith, believes that a
person is guilty of a felony, and -his belief rests on such grounds as would induce
an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the circumstances, to believe like-
wise, he has such probable cause for his belief as will justify him in arresting
without a warrant" 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 6, at 596 (1937). No case has been found
where it was held that the fourth amendment required any more where the issue
was the validity of an arrest. Some jurisdictions have, by statute, added the
requirement that there be a danger that the suspected felon will escape if not
arrested. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (Supp. 1957). Federal narcotics
agents are not common law peace officers, but the statute under which the agent
in the principal case acted authorizes arrest without a warrant where the agent
has "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person to be arrested has violated
the narcotics laws. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 70 STAT. 567, 26 U.S.C.§ 7607(2) (Supp. 1957). This in effect gives narcotics agents the same power
that common law peace officers have to arrest without a warrant. The two cases
on which Judge Huxman relied on this point, McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948), and United States v. Vleck, 17 F. Supp. 110 (D. Neb. 1936),
dealt with searches of dwellings without warrants and the federal courts have been
consistently critical of invasion and search of houses without a warrant in the
absence of exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32(1925), the Court said: "[I]t has always been assumed that one's house cannot
lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful
arrest therein." See also Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir.
1948).
The question is usually presented by the defendant's pre-trial motion to sup-
press evidence seized incident to the allegedly unlawful arrest. At least two cases
have rejected such information altogether on the ground that the arresting officer
must be possessed of facts that would be competent evidence in a jury trial and not
mere hearsay information. Gran v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) ; Worth-
ington v. United States, supra note 5. But this view, as pointed out by the districtjudge in the principal case, was disapproved in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), on the ground that the issue on defendant's motion was not hisguilt or innocence but was rather the reasonableness of the officer's belief in
guilt at the time of the arrest.
1958]
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and reliability are unknown is not considered.7 In United States v.
Blich8 the arrest was invalidated because the source of the information
was not given so that the court could pass on its reliability, while in
Ard v. United States9 the implication is that it was sufficient that the
officer considered the source reliable.
In a few cases there is dicta to the effect that reliable information
alone would be sufficient grounds on which to base an arrest without a
warrant. 10 But the general rule is that such information, unless sup-
plemented by further facts, is insufficient." In a majority of the cases
where arrests prompted by tips were upheld, the "further facts" were
things observed by the officers which of themselves tended to indicate
guilt independent of the informer's tip.12 In several cases the only
supplementary information the officers had was a knowledge of prior
criminal activity and the arrests were held lawful. 13 Two district court
cases stand in opposition to the two last-mentioned views, however.
In United States v. Clark14 the officers knew that a grocery store was
illegally selling narcotics, saw defendant enter the store with the in-
former, and by pre-arranged signal were tipped off by the informer that
defendant had narcotics in her possession when she came out. The
arrest was held unlawful because there was no showing (to the officers)
that "the informer's information was itself more than mere guess-work
7 Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
145 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
'54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932). See also
Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
839 (1947).
10 Cannon v. United States, snpra note 9, at 954; United States v. Heitner, 149
F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727 (1945) ; Somer v. United
States, 138 F.2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1943).
"' United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1951) (dictum) ; United
States v. Sebo, 101 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1939) (dictum) ; Wisniewski v. United
States, 47 F.2d 825, 826 (6th Cir. 1931) (dictum) ; United States v. Turner, 126
F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Md. 1954) (dictum); MACHEN, SARCH AND SEIZURE 51,
52 (1950).
12 Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (two passengers fled when
officers stopped defendant's car) ; United States v. Bianco, supra note 11 (de-
fendant carried abnormally large suitcase for one day trip and was seen with two
known offenders); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945)
(defendant dropped a bottle of opium wine on being approached by the officer) ;
United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
727 (1945) (defendants drove away rapidly after seeing the officers) ; Stobble v.
United States, 91 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1937) (defendant seen carrying two small
envelopes of the usual size and color in which heroin is contained); Coupe v.
United States, 113 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940)
(officers saw what looked like "numbers" pads through the window of defendant's
car) ; Wisniewski v. United States, supra note 11 (officers saw defendant get ajug and burlap bag out of a known bootlegger's car and put them in his own car).
""United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957); Ard v. United
States, 54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932); United
States v. Turner, 126 F. Supp. 349 (D. Md. 1954).1429 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
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und speculation." 15 In United States v. Baldocci'6 narcotics agents
were informed that defendant, a known previous offender, was throwing
dope over a prison's walls to inmates at night. The agents hid by tbh
wall and arrested defendant when he drove up in a car. The arrest wa-
invalidated because made "merely upon suspicion."
In the principal case there were no "further facts" within the agent's
knowledge. Nothing the defendant did independently aroused suspicion
and the agent had no knowledge of any past criminal activity. "Reason-
able grounds" consisted of the tip plus the fact that defendant's appear-
ance and movements conformed with the information given. At least
four cases would seem to be in accord. In Brady v. United States'7
the defendants' vehicles were stopped and arrests made after the move-
ments and makes of the vehicles had been checked against the informa-
tion supplied. In King v. United States 8 the movements of defendant's
auto were consistent with the tip. In White v. United States19 de-
fendant was arrested as he walked up to a house where addicts were
said to be awaiting his arrival with a quantity of narcotics. In United
States v. Hill2" the court paid lip service to the rule laid down in the
Clark case, viz., that information from third persons, no matter how
reliable, must be shown to be more than mere speculation, but then pro-
ceeded to hold that personal verification by the officers of defendants'
movements as described by the informer was sufficient. The quantum
of guilt-indication required by these cases was described in the Hill
case when the court said that reliable information alone was not
sufficient but that reasonable grounds existed when "the information
received . . . was verified, insofar as it could be, by personal observa-
tion and found to be accurate in its particulars. '" 2 1  The facts of these
cases show that the verification does not have to extend to conduct
which would tend of itself to indicate guilt of the crime.
While this line of cases, including the principal case, constitutes a
liberal departure from the reliable information plus further facts rule,
the decisions are considered sound.22
ROBERT W. KING, JR.
"
5 Id. at 140. The fact that the search turns up evidence of guilt has no bearing
on the question of whether the arresting officer had "reasonable grounds" at the
time of the arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
1842 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
300 Fed. 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 620 (1924).181 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1924).
10 16 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).
114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).21Id. at 442.
22 It would appear that the views best illustrated by the following quotation
have some support.
"As we look at some of the uses which the criminal classes have made of
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